The following values have no corresponding Zotero field: PB - Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd Hove,, UK.

One of the central debates amongst U. S. constitutional theorists for more than a generation has been between (conservative) ‘originalists’ arguing that, in interpreting and applying the Constitution, judges are duty bound to adhere to the original understandings at the time of the Constitution’s adoption and (liberal/progressive) ‘living constitutionalists’ arguing rather that, when appropriate, judges should read the Constitution in light of contemporary needs and moral aspirations. While acknowledging the significance and legitimacy of the originalist call for fidelity to history (...) and newly incorporating elements of their arguments into his theory, Fleming, in Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, re-affirms moral aspirationalism as the ultimate foundation of the interpretive project. I argue here, as against Fleming, that the opposition that he (and other American constitutional theorists) have drawn between originalism’s historicism and living constitutionalism’s moral aspirationalism is a false binary – the contingent product of a developmental succession of political battles between American conservatives and progressive/liberals over the course of the twentieth century. I argue here, contra Fleming, that in both theory and practice, in the U. S. at least, history and moral aspiration are and have always been inextricably intertwined —inseparable— and that, going forward, U. S. constitutional historians and theorists would do better by forthrightly acknowledging and accounting for this fact, and dynamic. (shrink)

In recent years, the constitutional freedom of association has assumed a relatively low profile. Today, the most extended discussions of the right consider it as a second-order countervailing claim in civil rights cases involving questions of identity and the right to exclude. This article provides a brief overview of the right at a time when it was one of the most widely discussed, first-order constitutional rights, and when those discussions centered not on the right to exclude but on the question (...) of “guilt by association.” The article provides a sampling of the way that right was considered in the immediate post-World War Two years in the writings of some of the era's most prominent civil libertarian thinkers – Leo Pfeffer, Milton Konvitz, Robert Cushman, Henry Steele Commager, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and Sidney Hook. These writings demonstrate that doctrinal development concerning the right was driven by its implication in two of the major political issues of the day: domestic security at the height of the Cold War and civil rights. The article concludes by arguing that, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the ongoing fight against terrorism, free association questions are likely to assume renewed prominence. It argues further that, in a contemporary context, those thinking about the most pressing freedom of association questions would profit by looking less to the more recent discussions of the right as a matter of the right to exclude, and more to the highly-relevant discussions of “guilt by association” by the currently less well known mid-century civil libertarians. (shrink)

In his dissection of the 1998 tobacco settlements, W. Kip Viscusi provides a window on how the ostensibly liberal public philosophy behind the modern American regulatory state betrays its foundational commitments. Animated by a moralizing concern with preventing harm to self, and a leftist antagonism towards corporate capitalism, “progressive liberalism” at first foundered in its war against the tobacco industry in the face of traditional liberal counterarguments about individual autonomy, knowledge of risk, and choice. Only when progressive liberals translated their (...) paternalist impulses into science‐centered arguments about ignorance and addiction, which involve barriers to autonomous choice and harm to others, did they succeed in turning the legal and regulatory tide against smoking. This dynamic raises questions about the future of individual autonomy in a science‐centered, progressive‐liberal modern polity. (shrink)

A review of empirical and theoretical work on reasoning and linguistic inference, which will be a useful introduction to the subject for students of language and thought. The book focuses on the relationship between what people do and what people are supposed to do when making inferences.

We propose that the pragmatic factors that mediate everyday deduction, such as alternative and disabling conditions (e.g. Cummins et al., 1991) and additional requirements (Byrne, 1989) exert their effects on specific inferences because of their perceived relevance to more general principles, which we term SuperPs. Support for this proposal was found first in two causal inference experiments, in which it was shown that specific inferences were mediated by factors that are relevant to a more general principle, while the same inferences (...) were unaffected by factors not relevant to the general principle. These results were extended to deontic inferences in two further experiments. Taken together, these findings show that unstated superordinate principles play a significant role in certain types of reasoning. Questions raised by the findings for the main theoretical approaches are discussed. (shrink)

This commentary focuses on the implications of practical reasoning research for the view of rationality in Stanovich & West's target article. Practical reasoning does not correlate with intelligence or other reasoning tasks. Explanation in decision making terms raises the issue of dilemmas, making it hard to specify the correct norm, when an action can satisfy or conflict with two equally justifiable goals.

ABSTRACTThe judgment of blame was studied in a group of 28 teenagers, 14 with Asperger syndrome and 14 typically developed. Teenagers in each group were matched by age, cognitive development and academic level. They were presented with 12 short vignettes in which they had to judge an action according to the intent of the actor, the consequences of the action and the seriousness of the situation. Results showed a significant difference in the patterns of judgment of both groups. The AS (...) group judged the action according to the physical consequence of the action more than the intent of the actor; the opposite was observed with the control group. In addition, the AS teenagers were less capable than the control group of grading injury to a person when apportioning blame especially when they were not familiar with the social situations. This result suggests that the judgement of the seriousness of the outcome of the social interactio... (shrink)

Power has been studied in various guises in both the social cognition and the reasoning literatures. In this paper, three experiments are reported in which this factor was investigated in the domain of deontic thinking. Power of source of deontic statements was varied within several scenarios, and participants judged the degree to which they thought an injunction would be carried out. In the first experiment, permission statements were used, and it was found that, as predicted, power was positively related to (...) degree of endorsement of deontic conclusions across scenarios. In the second experiment, these findings were generalised across three further deontic domains (threat, warning, and promise) and two different syntactic forms (conjunctive and disjunctive). In the third experiment, the hypothesis that power effects were mediated by subjective judgements of conditional probability was investigated and confirmed. It is argued that these results favour theories that give a general role to probabilistic factors, rather than those based on domain-specific schemas. (shrink)

Rampant moral relativism is widely decried as the leading source of the degeneracy of modern life.1 Though I proudly count myself a relativist, I rather doubt that relativism has anything like the cultural influence that its most ardent critics fearfully attribute to it. Much of what gets criticized under the rubric of relativism is often really no such thing. Relativists need not be hedonists, egoists, nihilists or even moral skeptics. Moreover, when it comes to the upper reaches of our intellectual (...) culture, relativism is more often dismissed than defended.2 I don’t deny that in certain literary corners of academe, relativism retains a fashionable post-modern cache.3 But in more sober philosophical circles, the catalog of ills from which relativism is widely thought to suffer is impressive.4 When taken as a characterization of the nature of moral discourse and moral argument, relativism is often thought to be descriptively inadequate. Contra the relativist, we do not treat moral disputes as rationally irresolvable. We do not tolerate all alternative moral “codes” as equally valid. Relativism may be true of merely cultural norms or practices. But morality has a felt universality that makes it quite different in character from a system of merely cultural norms or practices. In the face of morally abhorrent practices, we don’t simply shrug our shoulders and say that while the relevant practices may be wrong for us, they are alright for them. Relativism is sometimes even said to be self-undermining. It makes the very thing it purports to explain – the possibility of rationally intractable disagreements – impossible in the first place. Partly because of its supposedly self-undermining character, relativism is sometimes accused of being a strictly incredible doctrine. Those who profess to be relativists must, if this is true, either be insincere, confused, or self-deceived. Though someone might well sincerely hold the mistaken second-order belief that she believes that she believes that relativism is true, no one, in his or her deepest heart of hearts, sincerely, non selfdeceptively and informedly believes that relativism is true.. (shrink)

You've been looking for Jesus. At one time or another you have likely felt conflicted by two opposing desires: the longing to be truly seen and known, versus the drive to hide from real intimacy. This universal human experience points to one simple truth - we want to be loved, but are ashamed of our unworthiness. Only one Person could ever meet you in this dilemma, seeing your darkest secrets without flinching, offering the power to change, and loving you without (...) an agenda. This Person is Jesus. Before meeting Jesus, Ken Williams describes himself as a homosexual who was tormented by shame and on the brink of committing suicide. But in the person of Jesus, Ken discovered the affirmation, love, and wholeness he had been seeking. Since then, Ken has worked tirelessly to help others experience the same hope he found. Today, his life's work is to cultivate a productive and compassionate environment for those bound by sexual shame, insecurity, and fear, so that they can thrive in righteousness, peace and joy! In The Journey Out​, Ken Williams will... Reveal that change and freedom from same sex attraction are possible Demystify homosexuality and gender identity issues Help you to make a deep, authentic connection with Jesus Offer wisdom for supporters: parents, family, friends, or pastors If you are longing to be deeply known and unconditionally loved, your heart is crying out for Jesus. You will meet Him in the pages of The Journey Out, and discover a new life filled with true hope and enduring joy! (shrink)

Part I -- Scientific Composition and the New Mechanism. - 1. Laura Franklin-Hall: New Mechanistic Explanation and the Need for Explanatory Constraints. - 2. Kenneth Aizawa: Compositional Explanation: Dimensioned Realization, New Mechanism, and Ground. - 3. Jens Harbecke: Is Mechanistic Constitution a Version of Material Constitution?. - 4. Derk Pereboom: Anti-Reductionism, Anti-Rationalism, and the Material Constitution of the Mental. Part II -- Grounding, Science, and Verticality in Nature. - 5. Jonathan Schaffer: Ground Rules: Lessons from Wilson. - 6. Jessica Wilson: (...) The Unity and Priority Arguments for Grounding. - 7. Carl Gillett: The Metaphysics of Nature, Science, and the Rules of Engagement. - 8. Andrew Melnyk: Grounding and the Formulation of Physicalism. - 9. Alyssa Ney: Grounding in the Philosophy of Mind: A Defense. (shrink)

Game theory has proved a useful tool in the study of simple economic models. However, numerous foundational issues remain unresolved. The situation is particularly confusing in respect of the non-cooperative analysis of games with some dynamic structure in which the choice of one move or another during the play of the game may convey valuable information to the other players. Without pausing for breath, it is easy to name at least 10 rival equilibrium notions for which a serious case can (...) be made that here is the “right” solution concept for such games. (shrink)

This invited entry offers a brief overview of criminal responsibility. -/- The first part starts with a question: is Clyde criminally responsible for killing his girlfriend Bonnie? The answer: it depends. Particular circumstances determine whether Clyde is guilty of murder, guilty of manslaughter, not guilty because he has a good excuse, or not guilty because he has a good justification. -/- The second part addresses the complicated relationship between criminal responsibility and moral responsibility. Until recently, both concepts were considered to (...) be more or less interchangeable. But there is a growing movement, which I refer to as "responsibility skepticism," which maintains that moral responsibility is either physically or metaphysically impossible. If the responsibility skeptics are right (that moral responsibility is impossible), then what are the implications for criminal responsibility and just criminal punishment? Should we abandon these as well? Or can they survive without moral responsibility? I try to answer these questions. -/- The third part addresses social causation. The criminal justice system tends to be "dispositionalist"; it tends, that is, to assume that criminal responsibility resides entirely within the defendant. Dispositionalism, however, overlooks the fact that who we are and what we do are significantly determined by environmental influences. I then try to show that this "situationist" alternative to dispositionalism should not radically alter our approach to criminal punishment. -/- The final part briefly discusses the difficulty in evaluating criminal responsibility when the defendant is both an offender and a victim - especially when the defendant is an offender *because* of his victimization. (shrink)

It seems that when the term "coreference" is used, whether in linguistics or in philosophy, there is often presumed to be a consensus about what it is, or at least about what it is in the context where the term is introduced. I don't think the term deserves to have much use at all, insofar as it disguises more interesting linguistic and pragmatic relations between nominal forms in natural language. My preoccupation with these relations issues in part from some of (...) the central concerns and distinctions introduced in Evans (1980), an essay that has had wide and, in some cases, a very deep influence on how a variety of reference issues have been addressed in modern linguistics. As a linguist, my interest is in the way in which natural language shapes what we know and from that perspective, I want to understand how natural language sets boundary conditions on how linguistic forms can be used to achieve readings that pick out the same entity more than once. (shrink)

Ken Wilber : Well.... I started keeping these journals as a type of experiment. They are definitely personal journals, like a diary--they contain personal incidences, meditation experiences, accounts of events in my daily life, and so on. But they also contain entries that are short essays--anywhere from one to ten pages--on topics that are of concern to me and my writing, and I hope are of concern to others.

In this paper I will investigate the possibility of completing a Positivist style account of demarcation. One reason for pursuing this project is that standard criticisms of Positivism do not have the bite against the demarcation project that they are often assumed to have. To argue this will be the burden of the first part of this paper. The other reason is that new research in logic has provided machinery not available to the Positivists; machinery that shows promise for solving (...) some of the technical problems faced by Positivists' account of demarcation. To argue this will be the burden of the second part of this paper. (shrink)

On the Genealogy of Morals contains the puzzling claim that the will to truth is the last expression of the ascetic ideal. Part I of this essay argues that Nietzsche’s claim is that our will to truth functions as a tool allowing us to take a passive stance to the world, leading us to repress and split off part of our nature. Part II deals with Nietzsche’s account of the sovereign individual and his related, novel, account of free will. Both (...) these accounts hinge on the notion of the self as an integrated whole. In contrasting the integrated sovereign individual, who has genuine free will, and we splintered moderns, Nietzsche aims to unsettle us with uncanny suggestion that we have no genuine selves. Part III shows that the invocation of the uncanny is a central strategy Nietzsche uses to bring home his disturbing message that we are strangers to ourselves. (shrink)

As a generative linguist and syntactician, I share the general outlook established since the 1950's that the goal of syntactic research into the nature of the language faculty is to understand the nature of syntax as it is determined by Universal Grammar. My particular research foci have been, and continue to be, on the contribution of syntactic form to semantic interpretation, on the one hand, and on the nature of the linguistic typology made available by the innate language faculty.

ThatÂ’s sort of flip or flippant, I suppose, but the more you think about it, the more it starts to make sense. What if, just for the fun of it, we pretend -- you and I blasphemously pretend, just for a moment -- that we are Spirit, that Tat Tvam Asi? Why would you, if you were God Almighty, why would you manifest a world? A world that, as you say, is necessarily one of separation and turmoil and pain? Why (...) would you, as the One, ever give rise to the Many? (shrink)

The paper explores a metaphysics of information enriched by a computational view of Buddhism consistent with onto-ethics. To the extent that Floridi has explained the new philosophy of information as borrowing methods from computer science to approach philosophical problems computationally, I believe an applied philosophy of information can return the fruits of these results back to grounding issues in the practices of information technology. With this process we also foster a cross-fertilization between Eastern and Western philosophies, in the larger, intercultural (...) arena. (shrink)

It seems that when the term "coreference" is used, whether in linguistics or in philosophy, there is often presumed to be a consensus about what it is, or at least about what it is in the context where the term is introduced. I don't think the term deserves to have much use at all, insofar as it disguises more interesting linguistic and pragmatic relations between nominal forms in natural language. My preoccupation with these relations issues in part from some of (...) the central concerns and distinctions introduced in Evans (1980), an essay that has had wide and, in some cases, a very deep influence on how a variety of reference issues have been addressed in modern linguistics. As a linguist, my interest is in the way in which natural language shapes what we know and from that perspective, I want to understand how natural language sets boundary conditions on how linguistic forms can be used to achieve readings that pick out the same entity more than once. (shrink)

I argue for three conclusions. First, responsibility skeptics are committed to the position that the criminal justice system should adopt a universal nonresponsibility excuse. Second, a universal nonresponsibility excuse would diminish some of our most deeply held values, further dehumanize criminals, exacerbate mass incarceration, and cause an even greater number of innocent people (nonwrongdoers) to be punished. Third, while Saul Smilansky's ‘illusionist’ response to responsibility skeptics – that even if responsibility skepticism is correct, society should maintain a responsibility‐realist/retributivist criminal justice (...) system – is generally compelling, it would not work if a majority of society were to convert, theoretically and psychologically, to responsibility skepticism. In this (highly improbable) scenario, and only in this (highly improbable) scenario, the criminal justice system would need to be reformed in such a way that it aligned with the majority's responsibility‐skeptical beliefs and attitudes. (shrink)

Michael Fried’s unexpected contribution to defining the ontological status of video art includes an intriguing claim that projective art is particularly suited to the ‘staging’ of empathic projection. Fried applies Stanley Cavell’s notion of empathic projection, developed in relation to skepticism of ‘other minds’, to moving image installations that not only exploit the beholder’s capacity for empathically projecting, but do so in such a way as to reveal the mechanism at play. In developing this claim, I compare Fried’s key example (...) of Douglas Gordon’s Play Dead; Real Time with Bill Viola and Kira Perov’s Martyrs, a work that likewise elicits an emotional response but without a compensatory foregrounding of the underlying structuring mechanism. However, the comparison suggests that the staging of empathic projection should not be interpreted as an anti-theatrical strategy, but rather as an exemplary manifestation of what I am calling the configurational encounter – a revealing of the artwork’s conditions of existence. I reference Paul Sharits’s Epileptic Seizure Comparison, an important precursor to Gordon’s staging of empathic projection. Finally, I consider Chris Welsby’s landscape films in the light of the capacity of technology to reveal psychological mechanisms of projection, tracing such processes of projection to early childhood experiences of differentiating the human from the non-human. (shrink)

Ageing is basically a natural or physical phenomenon. For a human being, it belongs to the body. When this fact is noticed, a drama of oldness and life/death begins: ageing is a problem of experience. There are losses and gains in this experience. Indeed, a particular respect was paid to a rhapsodist/bard and a hermit because of their memory power and deep wisdom respectively. Since we recognize in these cases accumulation and maturation, the core subject in the experience of ageing (...) is memory and the time structure. Vis-à-vis the hard memories such as stone monuments and IC memory, the live memory is characterised by a creativity, which vivifies our past time. I pay a particular attention to friendship, because one of the most painful experiences of ageing consists in the loss of dear friends. Recollecting creatively the time shared with them, we can vivify our past, i.e. our being: that is the appropriation of ourselves. (shrink)

Using a case of intended but failed doping, the author seeks to answer the question of if an agent cheated when they intended to but failed in the case of doping due to inert, counterfeit drugs. The examination looks at the case using the concept of cheating and concludes by dividing the results of cheating into primary and secondary effects.

In recent years, certain analytic proposals have been appealed to that are incompatible with fundamental principles of structure−building that appear attractive. One such principle is Extension (Chomsky,1995), which ensures that what counts as the top of the tree at a given point in a derivation restricts the class of possible operations that can apply at that point. Another principle I will show to be desirable is Insularity, which bans on interarboreal movement.

This essay is a contribution to the discussion, now going on for many years, concerning what sorts of identity relations should be represented in the syntax and semantics of formal grammar and what properties those relations should have. In what follows, I will use the neutral cover term coconstrual to refer identity relations of one sort or another between nominals when no particular syntactic or semantic analysis is presupposed (among which are dependent identity, covaluation and coreference). The central claim made (...) here is (I), with its consequence in (Ia) and the far-from-innocent background assumption in (II). Most of my argumentation is designed to establish (Ia) to argue that it should be understood as the natural consequence of (I) and with respect to strict readings in ellipsis contexts. Although I will also argue for (II), I rely on Safir (2004b) for a more general defense of it. (shrink)

manner. The construction of the space-time structure that describes the dynamics of the neural network in a causal manner is a non-trivial problem. I critically review the idea of response selectivity as is applied to.

The primary goal of this paper is to distinguish binding from reflexivity in domains where they appear to overlap. In so doing I will argue that Principles A and B of the Binding Theory are symmetric in the domains to which they apply. This symmetry derives from a deeper unity that permits us to dispense with Principles A and B and replace them with interpretive principles that distinguish reflexivity and binding.